

17 OCTOBER 1963

NOTE TO: DDCI

Attached is a copy of a NODIS cable  
from Ambassador Blackwill laying out the impact  
of MBFR issues on the NATO Allies.

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INFO SSI-01 DOD-01 CIA-01 /003 A5

S/S PASS DOD EO WEINBERGER & CIA EO DCI PER BMCKINLEY 10/16/85

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ACTION OFFICE PM-01

INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 EUR-01

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INR-EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ; S/P-EYES ONLY RODMAN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3821

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 00697

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BLACKWILL

E.O. 12356: DECL. OADR

TAGS. PARM. MBFR NATO

SUBJECT: YOUR DECISION ON MBFR

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ALL OF THE AGENCY OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE NEXT U.S. MOVE IN MBFR ARE EFFORTS TO MEET THE TRADITIONAL TWIN CHALLENGES OF MBFR: ENSURING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY WHILE MANAGING NATO.
3. OUR ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT TASK IS COMPLICATED BY THE STRONG FEELINGS ON THIS SUBJECT HELD BY MRS. THATCHER AND CHANCELLOR KOHL AS INDICATED IN THEIR RECENT DETAILED PERSONAL MESSAGES TO YOU. INDEED, THESE TWO LETTERS REPRESENT THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE SUPPORT FOR MBFR BY THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN AND GERMANY IN MANY, MANY YEARS. AND NEVER SINCE THIS NEGOTIATION BEGAN IN 1973 HAVE THESE TWO COUNTRIES COORDINATED SO CLOSELY TO DEVELOP A COMMON POSITION.
4. I HAVE PARTICULAR SYMPATHY FOR FOHL WHO IS GOING THROUGH A DIFFICULT DOMESTIC POLITICAL TIME. HE IS UNDER

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CONSTANT ATTACK FROM WILLY BRANDT AND THE OPPOSITION, IN PART BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN SUCH A STAUNCH SUPPORTER SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE OF YOUR COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHEN WESTERN DEFENSE, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY YOUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE A BETTER FRIEND IN EUROPE THAN THE PRESENT CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY.

5. AS FOR MRS. THATCHER, NO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER IN RECENT HISTORY HAS HAD SUCH AN ACUTE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DANGEROUS AND ABIDING DIMENSIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT.

6. IN SHORT KOHL AND THATCHER ARE SERIOUS PEOPLE WHO, AS YOU KNOW, ARE ALSO DETERMINED TO SAFEGUARD WESTERN SECURITY. WHILE PROTECTING VITAL U.S. INTERESTS, WE SHOULD PAY ATTENTION TO HOW THEY BELIEVE THE WEST SHOULD PROCEED IN MBFR.

7. ONLY THE TWO OPTIONS PUT FORWARD BY SECRETARY SHULTZ AND MYSELF MEET THE CRUCIAL TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN BONN AND LONDON. MY OWN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE LESS ATTRACTIVE TO THE ALLIES BUT IN MY JUDGMENT THE U1 AND FRG COULD BE BROUGHT RELUCTANTLY TO ACCEPT IT.

8. THE BRITISH AND GERMANS HAVE ALREADY FORCEFULLY MADE IT CLEAR TO US THAT THE OTHER TWO OPTIONS WILL NOT SATISFY EITHER THEM OR ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS. THOSE OPTIONS WHICH DEFER TROOP REDUCTIONS WOULD PROVOKE A NEEDLESS STRUGGLE OVER THIS NEGOTIATION WITH OUR CLOSEST AND MOST IMPORTANT FRIENDS IN EUROPE. DURING MOSCOW'S CURRENT PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE, WE SHOULD AVOID HEADLINES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS OVER THE VIENNA TALKS. A STORY TO THIS EFFECT HAS ALREADY LEAKED INTO THE GERMAN PRESS.

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9. SUCH UNPRECEDENTED AND UNFORTUNATE NOTORIETY FOR MBFR WOULD WEAKEN NATO SUPPORT FOR YOUR FAR MORE IMPORTANT DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE THATCHER AND KOHL MESSAGES, SO COULD DELAY ON OUR PART IN RESPONDING CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THIS ALLIED INITIATIVE.

10. YOU CAN, OF COURSE, BE SURE THAT WHATEVER YOU DECIDE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED BY YOUR MBFR DELEGATION HERE IN VIENNA WITH THE GREATEST POSSIBLE DEDICATION AND ENERGY.

11. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT, STATE FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ, DOD FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CIA FOR DIRECTOR CASEY AND ACDA FOR DIRECTOR ADELMAN.

BLACKWILL

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